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For sale by the Superintendent o! DO(:uments. U.S. Government Printing OtIlce 
Washington , D.C. 20402 
REPORT OF PANEL 5 

ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF FIRE 

APPENDIX D-5 

TO 
FINAL REPORT OF 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
D - 5- 1 
This page left blank intentionally. 
D-5-2 
ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF FIRE 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Origin and Propagation of Fire Panel, 5. The task 
assigned for accomplishment by Panel 5 was prescribed as follows: 
Conduct inspections, chemical analyses spectrographic analysis of spacecraft, parts or rubble, 
or use any other useful techniques to establish point of fire origin, direction and rate of prop­
agation, temperature gradients and extremes. The nature of the fire, the type of materials con­
sumed, the degree of combustion shall be determined. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Origin and Propagation of 
Fire Panel: 
Mr. F. j. Bailey, Chairman, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. j. Craig, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. 1. Pinkel, Lewis Research Center (LeRC), NASA 
Mr. A. Krupnick, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), NASA 
Mr. T . Horeff, Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) 
Dr. H. Carhart, Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) 
Mr. j. Leak, Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 
Mr. j. Yardley, McDonnell Company, St. Louis, Mo. 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Dr. R. W. Van Dolah, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of Interior, Board Member, was 
assigned to monitor the Origin and Propagation of Fire Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. DETAILED OBJECTIVES: 

The detailed objectives of Panel 5 are listed as follows: 

a. Determine from direct visual examination of the physical evidence available at the scene 
of the fire, what facts can be established relative to the point of origin and the direction 
and method of propagation of the fire. 
b. Recommend any procedures, analyses, or tests that would he expected to establish ad­
ditional pertinent facts from this physical evidence. 
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c. Review or monitor the performance of these procedures, analyses or tests. Review the 
results obtained and report any additional facts established. 
d . Recommend any further action deemed appropriate. 
In the performance of this task , the Panel will keep itself informed as to the data being obtained 
by the other Panels and will make appropriate use of all pertinent information being generated by 
these Panels . The Panel will give verbal reports of its results to the Board at frequent intervals and 
will . develop its studies with the continuing advice of the Board. It will report its final results and 
conclusiom. in writing to the Board . 
2. APPROACH: 
Acting under the direction of the Board, Panel 5 considered the related problems of identifying 
the ignition source and establishing the fire propagation course through the Command Module (C/M) . 
While the main course of the fire can be reconstructed with confidence from the available evidence, 
the identification of the ignition source is more difficult and will require supporting facts derived from 
relevant laboratory studies . vVhile several ignition sources remain suspect , none have been confirmed 
and perhaps no positive ignition source will be found because the evidence may have been destroyed 
by the fire. 
This report treats the subject of ignition sources and fire development separately since each is 
controlled by different factors . 
3. IGNITION SOURCE: 
I n the conduct of its work, the Panel adopted the following points of view regarding the identili­
cation of the origin of the fire : 
a. A determination of the origin of a fire requires identification of the first combustible to 
burn and its ignition source . Proof that the identification is correct requires that the following 
checks be made: 
(1) The observed fire damage following the ignition can be demonstrated or explained. 
(2) The expected rate of the spread of fire and associated pressure rise in the C/M is con­
sistent with pressure and temperature indications recorded during the event. 
(3) All other combustibles are eliminated as being the first combustible to burn by virtue of one 
or more of the following points: 
(a) No available source to ignite the combustible . 
(b) Possible ignition source is known to be inactive at time of fire start. 
(c) If ignited, fire would not propagate from the combustible to produce the observed 
damage and the increase of pressure in the C/M. 
b . Information was gathered during the post-fire study of the C/M to facilitate the deter­
mination of the fire origin according to this plan. 
c. Ignition sources pertinent to the C/M include: 
(1) Electric arcs and sparks 
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(2) Electrostatic sparks 
(3) Friction sparks 
(4) Spontaneous combustion through the gradual heating of combustible by slow oxidation 
in thermally insulated zones. 
The investigation included an appraisal of these modes of ignition where they are applicable. 
d. Areas of the C I M containing electrical lines and fluid-bearing tubes in close proximity 
have burned and melted away. Therefore, the actual components involved in the start of the 
fire may no longer exist. Every effort was made to identify original components from the ash 
to assess their role in the fire start. Careful examination of these components along with related 
records of electrical, fluid flow and fluid pressure anomalies were undertaken to establish which 
of the damaged systems were abnormal shortly before the fire began and which damage was a 
consequence of the fire . 
e. It is typical of fires involving energized electrical systems for arcs and short circuit'S to develop 
during the fire as insulation fails. Therefore, if the ignition source is electrical , only those electrical 
arcs, sparks , and short circuits that preceded the fire are meaningful in establishing the probable 
fire origins. The section of this report containing observations and analyses presents that portion 
of the investigation devoted to sorting out these questions. 
f. One example of wire insulation damage that may have preceded the fire is illustrated by 
photograph (Enclosure 5-2). The circled area in the figure shows a wire bundle which lies over 
a bare stainless steel tube that is a waste management line . This tube lies below the aluminum 
access door to the carbon dioxide and odor absorber compartment of the Environmental Control 
Unit (ECU). When the door was opened and closed, its lower . edge may have chafed the wires of 
this bundle . There was no chafing guard for the Teflon insulation on these wires; this made 
them vulnerable to damage. Teflon is particularly vulnerable to cold flow and mechanical damage. 
Wire splices close by increased the susceptibility of the insulation to chafing damage. Careful 
investigation showed that the splices were too far from the chafing point to matter. Combustibles 
in the fonn of polyurethane foam and nylon netting lay close to the electrical arcs and sparks 
that would occur if the Teflon insulation were defeated. The same wires damaged by fire are 
shown encircled in photograph (Enclosure 5-3) . 
g. As of March 29, 1967, most of the electrical wifing in the CI M had been exposed to view. 
The ECU had been disassembled . Units containing electrical and electronic gear were examined 
to see if internally generated flames or incendiary arc~ and sparks could have issued from the 
openings. Only in three instances did the visual evidence justify detailed inspection of the electronic 
components . These units were the Translation and Rotation Controls and the Central Timing 
Equipment. Careful examination showed that the damage to these components was a consequence 
of the fire and thus they are not considered the source of ignition (References 5-1, 5-2). 
h. All wiring was inspected for faults and have been judged for their fire starting potential. 
The locations of these faults were recorded in Enclosure 5-4 and its attached diagram. Those 
which were clearly the result of the fire have been dismissed from further consideration. The remain­
der were studied in detail. Results on these investigations are reported in paragraphs i. through 
m . of Section 5 . Items still under investigation will be included in Appendix G after completion . 
i. Electrostatic and friction spark ignition possibilities were studied by Panel 8 in a program to 
establish the susceptibility of C 1M materials to ignition by these sources. This is a cooperative 
effort with Panel 5, which has stimulated complementary work on the ignition process in 100 
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percent oxygen atmospheres at government and contractor laboratories. The effect of contaminants, 
such as water/glycol leakage and cleaning solvents on the ignition and fire development processes 
of C/M materials will be a principal feature of these studies. 
j. More than one potential ignition source for the C/M fire may be found in this investigation. 
Every effort is being made to establish their relative. probability as the 012 C/M fire initiator. 
Laboratory tests and mock-up fires are the principal tools for these determinations. 
4. DESCRIPTION AND COURSE OF THE FIRE: 
a.Since the course of the fire was determined by the quantity and arrangement of the C/M com­
bustibles, reference is made to the report of Panel 8 in which these are detailed. Briefly summarized, 
the combustibles contained in C / M 012 included a liquid combustible water/glycol in a widely distributed 
system, and solid combustibles - mostly plastics in the nylon , polyurethane, and silicone rubber class. 
The nylon is mostly in cloth form ; the others appear as thin films, thick tapes with exposed pile, 
and foam plastics used largely for heat insulation and protective padding . A view of the Command 
Module from the hatch, photograph (Enclosure 5-6) shows the destribution of exposed solid combustibles . 
Throughout this report reference to location of C / M zones will be as viewed through the hatch in the 
manner of the photograph. The following description of the fire is divided into three stages for reasons 
of clarity and convenience in describing when the fire probably started and the specific phases of 
fire propagation . 
Stage 1 - Stage 1 began when the fire started, probably some seconds before the astronaut's first 
verbal indication of the fire at 23:31:04 .7 GMT (6:31:04.7 pm EST). This inference is based upon 
several anomalies in the telemetry data , Stage 1 concluded at about 23:31:19 .4 GMT when the internal 
pressure ruptured the pressure vessel. 
Stage 2 - Stage 2 is the period of greatest conflagration due to forced convection resulting from 
the out-rush of gases through the rupture . It probably lasted for about 5 seconds; it is estimated 
that the pressure reached ambient at about 23:31:25 GMT. 
Stage 3 - Stage 3 continued from about 23 :31 :25 GMT through the decaying phase of the fire, when 
high concentrations of carbon monoxide and smoke were produced, .for an undetermined time but 
which could not have exceeded several seconds . 
Note: During the later stages of the fire a localized, extremely intense, fire In the ECU lingered beyond 
the culmination of Stage 3. 
b. From observations of post-fire damage and witness statements, the fire first appeared to be at 
the lower portion of the left side of the C/M , presumably near the lower left corner (Enclosure 5-7). 
The slow rate of rise of recorded cabin pressure caused by the heat released by the fire suggests that 
the fire was not intense until about 23:31: 12 GMT (Enclosure 5-8). This slow rate of pressure rise 
is consistent with the view that the early fire was either located in a zone containing little combustible 
or one containing much bare aluminum structure which could absorb an appreciable portion of the 
heat. The first significant indication of pressure rise was shown by telemetry data at 23:31:08.4 GMT. 
c. By approximately 23:31 :12 GMT, the fire had propagated out of its initial confines to involve 
additional combustibles. Estimated extent of fire following this time is shown schematically in Enclosure 
5-9. The presumption is strong that flames along the left wall prevented the Command Pilot, who 
occupied the left couch , from operating the valve which vents the C/M to the ambient atmosphere. 
Such operation of the valve was an initial step in the established emergency fire procedure. However, 
this emergency procedure would have been to no avail because the venting capacity of the cabin pressure 
relief system was too low to prevent buildup of pressure within the C/M due to the fire . The heavy 
damage to the upper wall and ceiling in the left front corner, shown in Enclosure 5-10, shows the 
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intensity of the fire in this area. Since the oxygen concentration In the CIM was above 90 percent 
the first flames would be hot, bright , and relatively smoke free. They would rise vertically and spread 
out under the cabin ceiling. The Senior Pilot, who occupied the center couch , had the responsibility 
of unlatching and removing the hatch. The Senior Pilot's harness buckle was found in the latched 
position in accordance with standard procedures. 
Some burning of the lower portion of the Command Pilot's suit may have been started by the 
flames rising from the ECU area and the adjacent nylon debris trap . Tests of nylon debris trap(Raschel 
net) burning in oxygen show its tendency to sputter off firebrands of burning molten nylon which 
may be projected several inches horizontally from their origin . These firebrands increase the spread 
rate over that measured in small scale flame propagation studies of this material, particularly as the 
convection currents generated by the fire increase . During this period the Inertial Measuring Unit 
(IMU) record indicated that there was motion in the C/M. The inference is that the Command 
Pilot was moving energetically at this time, in reaction to the emergency. His communication was 
interrupted some time before (23: 31: 10 GMT) or about five seconds after the first recognition of fire. 
His Cobra Cable is presumed to have been disconnected before this time . 
d. Because there had been a history of electric arcs from the Pyro Battery to adjacent structure 
at the aft bulkhead level in the right front corner, this area was reviewed carefully as a possible site 
of the fire origin . The main combustible here is the nylon debris trap (Raschel Net) that extends from 
floor to ceiling . The extensive melting of this net (Enclosure 5-11), visible as fused yellow plastic 
adhering to CI M components in the corner indicates that the oxygen concentration at the time of its 
ignition was too low to burn it to completion. For this reason the right front corner is not regarded 
as the location of the origin of the fire. 
e. The second stage of the fire began at about 23:31:19 GMT when the cabin pressure record can 
be interpreted to mean that the pressure had risen to a range of 29 to perhaps 37.7 pounds per square 
inch absolute (psia) . This is the estimated failure range of the pressure vessel (Enclosure 5-8). This 
pressure would have resulted from the burning of three or four ounces of nylon, assuming adiabatic 
conditions. Cooling of the cabin atmosphere by the structure, would substantially increase this estimated 
quantity . 
f. A major failure in the aft bulkhead occurred at the junction of the· wall and aft bulkhead in the 
vicinity of the umbilical ( Enclosure 5-12). Cabin gases and flame flowed in the direction of the break 
in the floor. The flames, debris , and oxygen flowed into the toroidal space between the pressure 
shell and the heat shield where the thermocouples registered rapidly rising temperature at 23:31 :20 
GMT. Flames in the toroidal space burned and melted components of the Reaction Control System 
and the insulation and honeycomb structure of the aft heat shield. These flames also poured from 
access hatches in the crew compartment heat shield and set fire to combustibles situated on and around 
the spacecraft at levels A-8 and A-7 . These fires endangered pad personnel and impeded rescue. 
g. After cabin failure, the gas flowing toward the floor break swept the flames to other combustibles 
and increased the rate of fire spread markedly. Flames rising above the couches were directed into 
a horizontal plane to spread the fire over the couches. Examination of the couches and astronauts ' 
suits after the fire indicates the movement of these flames in the manner indicated in Enclosure 5-13 
Flame damage to the suits, harness, and helmet visors show that it was most severe for the Command 
Pilot and least for the Pilot. Witnesses at monitors of the television camera mounted outside the cabin 
hatch view port reported movement of flame from left to right inside the cabin. 
h . Inspection of the pressure vessel floor and aft heat shield, after separation, shows that frag­
ments of Command Pilot's suit were swept there by the flow of cabin atmosphere through the floor 
break. This implies penetration of his space suit by fire just prior to the second stage of the fire 
when the convective currents were near maximum. 
0-5-7 

i. Further evidence that fire crossed the couches from left to right is given by the melting and 
burning of the leg rest control handle on the left side of the left couch. This handle is formed from 
aluminum tubing. Tongues of flame flowing over the handle melted and burned its left side where 
heat transfer would be greatest. The result was a softened and deformed ledge of aluminum on the right 
side where the heat transfer was less (Enclosure 5-14). A plastic button at the base of the handle shows 
little deformation and no burning. An aluminum ingot deposited by molten metal from the handle 
lies adjacent to the plastic button . 
j . Some of the fire below the couch also swept in the direction of the floor break (Enclosure 5-15). 
Fire damage to the three helmet covers lying on the floor below the Senior Pilot ' s (middle) couch 
indicated that some of this flame spread around the lithium hydroxide (LiOH) canister storage box 
to the left of the helmet covers (Enclosure 5-16) . Fire damage to these covers is greatest on their left 
sides where the flames impinged. The fire damage to the helmet covers, shown in this photograph, 
is consistent with this view of the path. taken by the flames at this location . Enclosure 5-17 is a view of 
the helmet cover which lies closest to the hatch. Because the camera faces the hatch, the left side 
of the C/M is on the viewer's right. 
k. Absence of substantial heat damage to the LiOH canister storage box and the clean underside 
of the couch above the helmet covers indicates that these flameslasted for only a few seconds. Discrete 
damage to wire bundles at floor level along the right side of the C /M indicates part of these flames 
reached completely across the floor. 
I. Flames also moved from left to right along the front panel at slightly above floor level. With 
reference to Enclosures 5-18 and 5-19 , which show a portion of the floor in front of this panel, the 
damage to wire bundles where fire impinged is shown to be greater than to those which lie to their 
right, as indicated by the arrows on the photograph . The same relative fire damage is apparent on 
the metal clamp covering the wire bundles, being greatest on the left and least at the right. 
m. Substantial fire damage to paint and wiring insulation appears along the front panel, particularly 
above the batteries , and inverters as shown in Enclosure 5-20 . 
n . Fire damage lessens with displacement from left to right across the front panel above the floor. 
The modest damage to paint on the upper right section of the front panel shown in the above en­
closure demonstrates this point. Soot marks on the panels around the rectangular protuberances indicate 
the passage of a smoky flame moving upward and from left to right. Some of this smoky flame 
was provided by small local patches of Velcro which burned incompletely. A tongue of flame extended 
momentarily to the two wire bundles in the corner to do the localized damage visible in the photograph. 
o. Strong convection currents induced by the flow toward the aft bulkhead break may have swept 
some of these flames across the front panel. Patches of Velcro on the front panel and the nylon net in 
the right front corner may have been ignited by these momentary flames . 
p. Some of the failed 100 and 900 psia oxygen tubing below the Environmental Control Unit 
are shown in Enclosure 5-21. This photograph shows separated solder joints and burst sluminum tubing 
running near floor level below the suit circuit heat exchanger. The adjacent portion of the ECU, 
which contains the LiOH canisters shown in Enclosure 5-3, revealed broken coolant tubing (upper circle), 
more failed oxygen lines in the oxygen control panel area, and holes burned through the aft bulkhead 
and pressure vessel wall. The container for the LiOH canisters and adjacent structure show severe 
damage from a hot, sustained fire . 
q. The third and final stage of the fire followed the loss of pressure in the C/M through the aft 
bulkhead break . The remaining cabin atmosphere quickly became too deficient in oxygen to support 
flaming combustion and heavy smoke was formed which deposited soot on most C/M surfaces as they 
cooled. High concentrations of carbon monoxide also developed rapidly at this time. An intense 
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fire lingered under the ECU and the water and oxygen panels. There, broken oxygen and water/ 
glycol lines continued to supply oxygen and fuel from the supply tanks to support the fire that melted 
the aft bulkhead and burned the adjacent aft heat shield in this area. 
r. Inspection of components taken from many areas of the C/M panel shows momentary penetrations 
of hot gases and flame through unsealed openings . These penetrations were probably assisted by the 
rapid increase in pressure difference across the face plates. This is associated with the rapid expansion 
of the hot cabin atmosphere shortly before aft bulkhead burst and the pressure fluctuation that followed 
the burst. Local melting and burning of potting compounds, wire insulation and plastic electric con­
nectors are evident. Details of this damage by flame and hot gas penetration is given in the enclosures. 
s. Flames penetrated zones behind side and overhead panels and traveled for a distance of up to 
a foot along thermal insulation on water/glycol lines. This fire damage was confined to the insulation 
along which the fire traveled. Such fires could cause crippling damage to adjacent electrical components 
and serious fire spreading can result. 
t. In the same areas, there is also a considerable amount of very localized directional burning as 
would be produced by jets of hot gas or flame. Details of such damage are given in the enclosures. 
5. OBSERVATIONS: 
a . Observations from the post-fire inspection of the C/M are summarized in the following para­
graphs. Supporting photographs are listed. Significant findings which bear on the search for the origin 
of the fire, the mechanics of fire propagation and the effects of the fire are given. An over-all represen­
tation of the areas suffering the most severe fire damage is illustrated in Enclosures 5-3 and 5-21. It 
is apparent that the highest intensity fire generally emanated from the left front, -Y, +Z, area. 
Descriptive details, by equipment and / or panels in each of the bay areas, are given in the Enclosures 
5-23, 5-27, 5-20, 5-32, 5-35, and 5-37. It must be emphasized that some of the features of the early 
fire are probably masked by the damage that occurs in the later stages of the fire. 
b. Fire started near the left-front (-Y, +Z) corner in the area adjacent to carbon dioxide and odor 
absorber compartment. Boilerplate mock-up tests conducted at MSC with a fire starting in this location 
showed a history very close to that deduced from an inspection of the damage to C/M 012. The pres­
sure development associated with mock-up fire correlates well with the pressure-time trace recorded 
during the C/M 012 fire . 
c. The following observations were made of the flame propagation and damage to the three couches. 
In general, there is no visible structural damage of the aluminum couch structure and sheet material 
except for, in some cases, destruction of the anodized coating.. 
(1) Conditions - The sooting patterns reveal that the "as-found" POSItiOns of the seat pans, 
lower leg rests and foot rests were the same as when the sooting took place: (a) The keyways of the 
trunnion locks are sooted except for the left couch i 700 keyway, the center couch 960 keyway, 
and the right couch 2640 keyway, (b) The lock pins and their receptacles are sooted or not sooted 
to conform to these same positions. and (c) The foot rest side panels are sooted to indicate no 
motion from their present positions after sooting. 
The foot rest area of the three couches offered several indications of decreasing temperature 
from the left side to the right. The nylon sheathing material on the foot restraint cables of the left 
couch is completely gone except for a very small quantity near the swaged ball fittings. Proceeding 
to the right there is an ever increasing amount of sheathing material remaining on the cables. 
The Velcro hook patches on the left sides of the leg rests are melted down completely; whereas, 
the ones on the right side, although heat damaged, retain their identity as hook material. 
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The foot restraint straps follow the same left to right pattern. Those of the left couch are 
completely melted away. The straps of the center couch are present, but semi-melted, the left 
one still attached at both ends, the right one conn<:cted only to the right arm. The right couch 
straps are completely connected; they are partially melted but to a lesser extent than those of 
the center couch. 
It is noted that the left lower arm rest pad assembly of left couch had been attached to the 
lower arm rest tube with epoxy; whereas all others had been attached by six rivets each (three 
on each attachment bracket) . The left lower arm rest pad assembly was the only one separated. 
Some of the epoxy shows application of heat after separation; all epoxy remained on the tube. 
The lower arm rest pad assembly was found on the aft bulkhead of the C / M on the -Y side 
directly under the reentry oxygen bottle. It was inverted. The bracketry at the bracket/epoxy 
interface was clean. The nylon pad (face down on the aft bulkhead) was badly burned as are all 
other arm rest pads with the exception of the left pads of the right couch . 
The left seat pan lock handle has had the aluminum tube wall melted away at the front formed 
bend (outer curvature only); most of the remaining portions of the tube show heat cracking. The 
plastic striker plug on this handle shows signs of flowing and has partially exited the tube although 
the plug had retained its basic shape . The other two lock handles were not heat damaged nor 
were the plastic plugs. 
The left couch right foot rest has a collection of molten aluminum in its right-hand trough 
at the foot restraint arm. This aluminum appears to have dripped from the access panel of the 
potable water tank. This panel is in the +X direction from this foot rest when the rest is in the 
usual position and the pan lowered to the 1700 position. The collection appears to have dripped 
rather than to have been blown to this area. 
All Dacron restraint harness material shows some signs of melting. The bayonets of the left 
and right harnesses were out of the buckle and sooted after removal. All three bayonets of the 
center harness are still inserted in the buckle . The center harness had extensive melting of the 
webbing between the buckle and the three left attachment points. The sooting patterns on all 
the ·head rests indicate that the head rest tabs were, at the time of sooting, in the same positions 
as found following the fire. 
The cushioned areas of the seat pans had almost all cushion material burned or melted away 
with some sooting action taking place under the cushion area. This pattern is completely different 
from the cushioned area of the back pans which are almost completely clean. The Velcro hook 
for the back cushions is darkened but still retains its blue color and hook appearance. 
(2). Observations 
(a) When the couch exposed areas were sooted. the seat pans, foot rests and head rest 
tabs were in the as-found position, i.e. : 
1. Left seat -1700 
Left head rest tabs -folded 
Left foot rests -extended 
2. Center seat _960 
Center head rest tabs -left folded, right extended 
Center foot rests ·stowed 
3. 	Right seat _2640 
Right head rest tabs -folded 
Right foot rests -stowed 
I D-5-10 
(b) The hottest area was under and to the left of the left couch foot rests (in the -V, +Z 
direction from the foot rests). 
(c) There was a directed flame path from the area described in (b) across the left couch 
seat pan lock handle (and translation controller). 
(d) The conditions of the couches indicate that the flame front spread from the left to right 
(Velcro facing "upwind" highly damaged; Velcro facing "downwind" less damaged under 
and along the foot rests and seat pans) . 
(e) There are no major heat sources indicated by couches other than those described above. 
d. There is no evidence to indicate that water/glycol from the ECU contributed significant fuel 
in the first two stages of the fire. After the lines failed it was the principal combustible for the sus­
taining fire in this area. However, the water/glycol system cannot be exonerated as a potential con­
tributor to an electrical ignition source. Laboratory analysis of ash taken from the aft bulkhead shows 
presence of glycol and there was a history of prior glycol spills in this area 
e. Due to the condition of the carbon dioxide and odor absorber compartments the possibility was 
considered that an explosion and fire originated in these compartments, resulting from hydrogen pro­
duced by a reaction of lithium hydroxide with water and aluminum. However, both of the lithium 
hydroxide canisters in the spacecraft at the time of the fire were of the impregnated fiberglass variety. 
They were so constructed that the lithium hydroxide pellets were not in direct contact with aluminum 
metal. In order to produce significant quantities of hydrogen, liquid water must be present to dis­
solve lithium hydroxide and bring it in contact with aluminum metal. Qualification data for the dew 
point of the gas leaving the compartment is 60° F, yet the temperature measured at 23:30:50 GMT 
was 89" F. Also, the cabin temperature was 76.5° F, hence water could not have condensed in the 
lithium hydroxide canisters. 
f. Electrostatic discharge from nylon or similar material was considered by the Panel to be a remote 
possibility, it cannot be completely discounted at this time. Consequently, experiments were conducted 
to assess this possibility. (See Appendix D-8) 
g. For simplicity and where practical. the results of investigations of the equipment bays are com­
bined and a summary of conditions and conclusions are presented. 
(1) Right Hand Equipment Bay 
The instrumentation, wiring, panels, and rear pressure vessel wall were sooted and fire damage 
was slight. Some debris resulting from fire damage was found on the aft bulkhead in the open 
areas. The compartment floor under the Earth Landing Sequencer and Circuit Interrupter areas 
showed moderate fire damage which was probably due to fire sweeping under these compartments 
to the break in the aft bulkhead. None of this fire damage is indicative of a fire source. En­
closures 5-24, 5-25, and 5-26 visually show' the'subject area and Enclosure 5-27 is a detailed tabu­
lation of findings. 
Based upon visual observations of the extent of damage and condition of equipment, the Right 
Hand Equipment Bay cannot be considered as the ignition source area even though the combustible 
materials in this area provided fuel. 
(2) Forward Equipment Bays (Right and Left Hand) 
The conditions observed in the Right Hand Forward Equipment Bay showed only minimal 
fire damage (Enclosure 5-28 and 5-29). However, in the Left Hand Forward Equipment Bay 
(LHFEB) some of the bottom panels received very severe damage due to localized flame impinge­
ment originating from the Left Hand Equipment Bay. Heavy sooting in this area occurred during 
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the third stage of the fire. Based upon the above evidence, the Forward Equipment Bays cannot 
be considered as a ignition source. 
(3) Lower Equipment Bay (LEB) 
The conditions found in the upper portion (+X, -Y) of the LEB indicate that the fire damage 
to the external surfaces of panels and instrumentation was more severe on the left and decreased 
in intensity as it progressed toward the right. Food panels B through E showed severe heating. 
Jet effects were observed on the front face of the Guidance and Navigation instruments; however, 
the electronic portions in the interior were relatively unscathed except for some localized damage 
due to intense heat. The resultant damage was due to melting and burning of some of the potting 
compound. In a few cases the wire insulation was damaged. The flame patterns in this area 
indicated that damage was a result of a secondary fire and hot gases. Enclosures 5-30, 5-31, 
5-31A and 5-32 present the detailed conditions found in this area. 
In the -X, -y , portion of the LEB, fire damage was found to be more severe on the left 
and decreases toward the right. The cover plate on junction box (15-1A-52) and an adjacent wire 
show evidence of arcing. The wiring between this panel and inverter shows evidence of being mashed 
as well as fire damaged . In the area belov.' this panel, most of the wires are stripped of insulation 
due to intense heat. The e<x terna l \-"iring showing the most severe damage was the biomedical 
adapter " Octopus" cable, extending across the LEE from + to -Y, and the gas chromatograph 
cable harness tied to an exposed cable harness above inverter No.3. These two items are discussed 
in more detail in 'Enclosure 5-32. 
While the faces of the instrumentation in the LEB showed sever to slight damage from lett 
to right, the interior of the instrument packages showed only superficial damage. In some cases, 
however, there was observed localized entry of flame and heat into some of the instrwnents in 
and around the connectors. Based upon the condition of the instrumentation, condition of the face 
panels, and interior compartments of the LEB, none of the instrumentation in this area is con­
sidered to be the primary ignition source. However, the electrical cable to connector "J -185" in 
the lower left hand corner was investigated .in the laboratory . 
(4) Left Hand Equipment Bay (LHEB) 
The most extensive fire damage to tubing and wmng was observed in the water panel area 
and below the carbon dioxide abosrbers. Severe to moderate damage to the insulation and some 
cables was observed in the Environmental Control Unit. Penetrations through the aft bulkhead 
and pressure vessel wall were found to be a result of a high temperature flame jet. The side 
panel between the oxygen / water panels and tr;e carbon dioxide absorber melted through and the 
melt collected on the aft bulkhead in fro!1t of the panel. Lithium hydroxide and charcoal were 
found under this ingot indicating that the carbon dioxide absorbers had failed prior to melting of 
the panel. Wiring below the carbon dioxide absorbers show possible arcing. Enclosures 5-33, 
5-34 and 5-35 show detailed conditions of · the LHEB. The left hand portion of the LHEB shows 
less fire damage than the right hand section . Based upon the conditions observed in the LHEB 
the right hand portion of this bay cannot be exonerated as a possible fire source. 
(5) Main Display Console (MDC) 
In general the front panel faces of the .MDC showed decreasing fire and heat damage from 
left to right with the flash angle being between 30" to 45° in the -Y, -Z direction. Some buttons, 
switches and dial faces showed severe damage. Instrument panel 21 (Enclosure 5-38) shows the 
type of generalized sooting and damage to electronic components, particularly of sooting and heat 
entry at the thulnb wheel opening. However, except for a few localized heat damaged areas, the 
instrumentation and electronics only showed superficial heat and smoke damage. The comditions 
found in and around the MDC are presented in Enclosure 5-36 and 5-37. This evidence indicates 
that the Main Display Console is not a probable ignition source. 
h. The wiring in the Spacecraft was subjected to a meticulous survey under 7x power magnification 
to detect possible arcing. As a result of this survey of the wire damage, only ten wires were considered 
as likely ignition sources. All other wire damage occurred during the fire. The ten electrical faults 
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have been or are under study as possible ignition sources. These possible sources are: 
(1) Gas Chromatograph Cable (Enclosure 5-4, Source No . 3, Coordinates G -15) . 
(2) Biomedical Adapter " Octopus" Cabel (Enclosure 5-4, Source No. 20, Coordinates E-15). 
(3) Arcing 	 in and under the Carbon Dioxide and Odor Absorber Compartment (Enclosure 
5-4, Source No. 15 and 16, Coordinates L-ll and L-14). 
(4) Wires in Channel H (Enclosure 5-4, Source No. 19, Coordinates F-17). 
(5) 	Wire between Inverter No. 3 and Junction Box C-15-1A-52 (Enclosure 5-4, Source 17, 
Coordinates G-15) . 
(6) DC power to Connector J-185 (Enclosure 5-4, Source No. 3, Coordinates G-15) . 
(7) AC power to Suit Compressor No.1 and No . 2 (Not located in Enclosure 5-4). 
(8) Suit Biomedical Adapter Harness (Not located in Enclosure 5-4) . 
(9) Cable Harness to Cabin Fans (Not located in Enclosure 5-4). 
(10) Cable Harness to ECU Instrumentation Power Supply and its mating harness . 
i. A detailed study of the disposition of the gas chromatograph cable harness and connector before 
and during the fire was made (Enclosure 5-23) . From observational evidence of photographic enlarge­
ments and the condition of the connector it has been ascertained that the gas chromatograph cable 
did not reside on the aft bulkhead before the fire started, where it was found after the fire, but was 
in or near the gas chromatograph bay. Metallurgical and spectrographic studies of the 115 VAC wires, 
as well as laboratory experiments, indicates that the melting of the copper wire within the nickel sheath 
was a result of external heating, which burned away the Teflon insulation, with subsequent shorting of 
115 V AC lines . The results of these events caused molten copper to exude through discontinuities 
in the nickel sheath. Therefore, as based upon these findings, the has chromatograph cable harness and 
connector cannot be considered as an ignition source. 
j . The Biomedical Adapter " Octopus" cable and connector were studied visually by microscopic 
examination. Several areas were observed that indicated possible arcing along the twisted wire pairs 
of the cable harness . These areas were replicated and submitted to electron microscopic examination 
at a magnification of approximately 5000 diameters. The photomicrographs of the suspicious areas 
indicated point source melting and defects in the metal surfaces produced by low energy intennittent 
arcing. Based upon the degree of melting and the depth and length of these defects it was detennined 
that this type of arcing could not raise the temperature of the Teflon to a spontaneous ignition level. 
In addition, the number and condition of arc spots along a length of twisted pair of wires indicated 
that the Teflon insulation had been burned from the cable harness prior to arcing. Investigation of 
the shielded cable did not reveal any suggestions of arcing; therfore, it is concluded that the wiring 
in the "Octopus" cable harness did not provide a primary ignition source. X-ray examination, re­
sistance, and continuity checks of the "Octopus" cable connectors were negative and showed no anomalies. 
k. The cable harness to the ECU Instrumentation sensor power supply contained both 28VDC Bus 
A and 28VDC Bus B to provide redundant power. Because of the redundancy, a short in the power 
conductor of one Bus would not be revealed by the telemetery data from these instruments. Whether 
or not a short occurred cannot be detennined because of extensive destruction of the wire bundle 
by the lingering fire in this area. 
I. In order to provide clarity m assessing the damaged area in the lower left hand area (-Y, +Z) 
of the Lower Equipment Bay it is necessary to consider several components and the wiring in this 
area . The subjects are cover plate to C-15-1A-52 and adjacent wiring , the DC power cable to connector 
J -185 and the Gas Chromatograph Cable Harness, the Flight Qual Recorder, and the extreme left 
hand portions of the Patch and Auxiliary Electronic Control Assemblies (ECA's). 
(1) The abraided wire and adjacent cover in front of Junction Box C-15-1A-52 was investigated 
to detennine whether this wire had shorted to the panel and to assess the results if arcing had 
occurred. Both the wire and the panel were submitted to microscopic and metallurgical examination 
to detennine the extent of arcing and thennal profile. Microscopic examination of the wire revealed 
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evidence of arcing and that the Teflon insulation had been cut prior to the arcing, as detennined 
from tear fragment remaining on the insulation around the arc site and the decomposition level 
of the insulation. 
(2) A transverse section of the wire was carefully polished in 0.001 to 0.002 inch increments 
and etched to obtain the grain structure in the unaffected and affected heat zones and to establish 
the thennal profile. The grain structure revealed that the arc site was localized in an area of 
approximately 0.1 inch and the fire damage to the wire was exceedingly slight. The cover plate 
also revealed an arc site in the lower right hand corner (Enclosure 5-3IA) under microscopic exami­
nation , however, the nylon chafing guard adjacent to the arc point and running along the bottom of the 
plate received only minor damage as a result of melting due to heat. The rear of the nylon guard 
closest to the arc point was almost intact. 
(3) Emission spectrographic analysis of this panel revealed that it was made of type 2024 alu­
minum alloy ~ Hardness and conductivity tests showed that the alloy was in a T-6 condition (type 
of heat treatment); however, the extreme left side was found to be in a T-3 condition. This 
indicates that the left side of the panel was exposed to temperatures between 425°C and 475°C but 
that center and right side were never exposed to this thennal level. 
(4) The DC power cable to the J -185 connector which supplies the Medical Data Acquisition 
System Recorder was found to be damaged where it turns in a right angle bend to run along 
channel K below the Gas Chromatograph (GC) Bay. This damage was just below and to the 
right of the Flight Qual Recorder. Microscopic and metallurgical examination revealed that this 
cable was exposed to the same thennal environment as the Gas Chromatograph cable harness. 
Therefore, the insulation and subsequent melting and shorting was the result of exposure to a short 
duration but intense flame. 
(5) The Flight Qual Recorder face plate was checked for conductivity profile. The analysis indi­
cated no variation in temper. The Velcro on the surface showed melting primarily with slight fire 
damage; however, the adhesive was intact and no damage was done to the paint below the adhesive. 
(6) The left hand edges of the Pitch and Auxiliary ECA's originally had Velcro, attached to 
their surface; however, after the fire the Velcro, its adhesive, and panel paint had been completely 
consumed except for a small amount of adhesive and Velcro residue on the lower portion of the 
Pitch ECA face plate. It is inferred that damage to these panels was a result of flame jet arising 
from the ECU area which damaged the cable harness to the J-185 connector and the Gas Chromato­
graph. 
(7) Little evidence was found to indicate that the arc between the cover plate toC-15-IA-52 
and the adjacent wire could have been an ignition source, based only on the observations and 
analyses in the preceding paragraphs. While the adjacent areas to this panel do not show severe 
damage one cannot preclude the possibility that water/glycol residue on the wiring and adjacent 
metal parts may have provided a propagation path. It is also possible from the size of the arc 
spots, and the nylon chafing guard remaining after the fire, to conclude that the resultant flash 
was too small to have ignited the nylon chafing guard along the bottom of the cover plate. 
However, the arc could have ignited glycol residues, had they been present, · resulting in a flash 
in the upward direction which in turn ignited the large Velcro patch on the Flight Qual Recorder. 
Therefore, based on this possibility the arcing in the above area cannot be eliminated as a possible 
primary ignition source. A series of experiments are in order to establish whether or not the above 
hypothesis is reasonable. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDING: 

Damage to components, wiring and compartments in Right Hand Equipment Bay was found to 

be superficial. 
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DETERMINATION: 

This bay could .not have provided a primary ignition source, even though it provided some fuel 

for fire. 

2. FINDING: 

Damage in most of the areas of the Forward Equipment Bays was found to be superficial. Some 

panels in the Left Hand Forward Equipment Bay received severe fire damage from flames arising 

from the Left Hand Equipment Bay . 

DETERMINATION: 

These bays did not provide a primary ignition source. 

3. FINDING: 

Severe damage to wiring was found at the bottom of the Lower Equipment Bay along the aft 

bulkhead. Evidence of arcing was found on the cover in front of C-IS-IA-S2 and adjacent wires. 

Damage was less severe in the +Y (right hand) dilection in this bay. 

DETERMINATION: 

Electrical arcing in the extreme lower left hand corner of this bay could have provided a primary 

ignition source. 

4. FINDING: 

Right hand portions of the Left Hand Equipment Bay received severe damage . Wiring, tubing 

and components in the carbon dioxide absorber compartment and oxygen/water panel compartment 

were burned and melted. Penetrations in the aft bulkhead and pressure vessel wall were observed. 

The carbon dioxide absorber compartment showed heavy fire damage and failure was due to pres­

sure overload and melting caused by the fire in this area. 

DETERMINATION : 

Electrical arcing in the right hand portion of this bay could have provided!. primary ignition source. 

5. FINDING: 

Main Display Consoles (MDC) showed evidence of heavy fire and heat damage on left side; however, 

the interior of the instrumentation showed only superficial damage. 

DETERMINATION: 

The MDC did not provide a primary ignition source. 

6. FINDING: 

There is strong evidence that fire effects on the couches lesulted from fire originating in the Left 

Hand Equipment Bay. 

DETERMINATION: 

These couches were not a primary ignition source. 

7. FINDING: 

The Rotation" Controller bore evidence of external heating and indicatioris that flame penetrated 

the control from the upper rear area of the C/M. The Translation Controller had a large part of 

the upper rear corner missing which is probably due to the controller being hit by an external 

object after it had been weakened by flame impingement. 

DETERMINATION: 

Thel"e is no evidence that any failure· occurred in either the Rotation or Translation Controllers 

that could have been the probable cause of fire ignition. 

8. FINDING: 

The spacecraft was thoroughly searched for unaccounted for objects or othel" evidence that the 

fire may have been deliberately set. 

DETERMINATION: 

No evidence was uncovered that suggested sabotage . 

9. FINDING: 

Evidence of electrical arcs from conductor to conductor and conductOI to structure was found. 

DETERMINATION: 

No arc could be positively identified as the unique ignItIon source. Three were found that l}ad, 

all of the elements needed to cause the disaster. Two of these showed evidence of poor engineering 

and installation. 

10. FINDING: 

Investigation of certain panels or components is incomplete. The remammg investigations are 

primarily concerned with determining functionality and adquacy of design. 
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DETERMINATION: 

The possibility that these incomplete investigations will uncover information that will modify these 

determinations is remote. 
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WIRING UNDER CO 2 ABSORBER ACCESS DOOR 
ENCLOSURE 5-2 
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APOLLO 204 
REVIEW lOUD 

FEI 22.19&7 

2 S 
DAMAGED WIRING UNDER ACCESS DOOR 
ENCLOSURE 5-3 

ELECTRICA L SYSTEM DAMAGE 
SOURCE NO. COORD. DESCRIPTION 
1. K-ll 
2. U -33 
3. G -IS 
4. F-16 
S. K -17 
K -17 
7. G-19 
8. K-20 
9. K -20 
10. L-21 
11. M-21 
See Attached Diagram 
Two small wire runs behind water and oxygen control 
panel lower LHEB. Run comes up (-X direction) from 
the aft bulkhead via wire clamps on the rear of the water 
panel and on the side wall to connections on the 02 con­
trol panel. 
Bare wires are seen in this run approximately 2 inches either 
side of the wire clamps located on the water panel. 
Cable and connector to small "Black Box" (3 in. X 3 
in.) located inside LHEB on the hinged side of the cabin 
air intake screen. Bare wire is seen at right angle bend 
in this run where it turns outboard and forward to join 
main wire harness loeated on the side wall. Fraying may 
have been introduced by chafing against hinged door (screen) 
during repeated opening and closing . 
Outboard harness and inboard harness In LEB run below 
gas chromatograph installation . Significant damage is seen 
to have occurred to the outboard run with minor damage 
to the inside of the inboard run . 
Wire run located in trough below Scientific Equipment 
B stmage compartment in LEB. Bare places are seen in 
small gage wire on the inboard side of this run . 
Battery instrumentation leads located in a plastic bag on 
the aft bulkhead under the right hand battery in the LEB. 
wire bundle running in+Y, -Y direction under the inboard 
edge of the LEB. Bare wires are seen in the top (+X 
side) of this bundle. 
Center wire bundle of three which run outbmu'd on aft bulk­
head between inverter no. 2 and inverter no . 3. Bare 
wires are seen in the top of this bundle . 
Wire bundle running to connector portion of panel 150 
on aft bulkheat. Bare wires are seen for about 5 inches 
small gage wire running to the top row of circuit breakers 
on panel 150 on aft bulkhead . Fraying is seen to occur 
about 1 in . from the panel and running several inches back 
along this run . 
Wire run going outboard on bulkhead underneath sequencer 
area (RHEB) . Bare wire is seen in the top of this bundle 
at approximately t he point beneath the access panel. 
Wire bundle on bulkhead running in &Z,Z direction along 
the edge of the RHEB. Bare wires are seen in the top of 
this dundle beneath the loea tion of the red streamer "Remove 
Before Flight" tag associated with the Earth Landing System 
(ELS) shorting plug. 
ENCLOSURE 5·4 
D - 5·21 
SOURCE NO. COORD. 
12. 
13. N-26 
14 . N-21 
15. L-14 
16. L-ll 
17. G-15 
18. L-14 
19. F-17 
20 . E-15 
See Attached Diagram 
DESCRIPTION 
Wire bundle running up (S-X) left side of the RHEli com­
partment and looping to the right. Bare wire is seen along 
the inboard edge of this run in several places. 
Small gage wires running to small black boxes to the top 
right of the cavity described previously in source 12 Bare 
wires are seen on several strands. 
Wire bundle intelsection on bulkhead of a&Z,-Z and &Y, 
-Y run located beneath the edge of the RHEB below cavity 
desorbed in Source 12. Many bare wires are seen on the 
top and towards the centel of this bundle. 
Wire bundle running outboard undel hinged LiOH canistel 
door. . fraying is seen in the top of this bundle at the 
attenuatOI line. 
Connector panel for ECU in LHEB . Damage to con­
nectors is seen on top side, but less severe on bottom side 
of these connectors. 
Evidenxe of alC between wire and cover plate of C-15-1A­
52 junction box . Wire appealed to press on edge of plate. 
Nylon chafing guard on cover plate is 3.16. in from alced 
spot. 
Severely burned lesidue from wire bundle lunning undel 
brace for wall between LiOH canistel and remainder of 
ECU. 
Wires severely btu ned, melted and fused in Channel H. 
Octupus cable had · highly localized melting and arcing 
on twisted pailS. 
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EXTREME UPPER LEFT HAND CORNER BETWEEN LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY 
AND LEFT HAND EQUIPMENT BAY 
ENCLOSURE 5-10 
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EXTREME RIGHT HAND CORNER ABOVE LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY AND RIGHT HAND EQUIPMENT BAY 
ENCLOSURE 5-11 
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LEG REST CONTROL HANDLE 
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VIEW OF HELMET COVERS 
ENCLOSURE 5-17 

VIEW OF FLOOR BELOW LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY 
ENCLOSURE 5-18 

VIEW OF AFT BULKHEAD WIRING BELOW INVERTERS 
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